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Article
Introduction
Accounting exists primarily to provide relevant information 
to the various stakeholders; the information provided, how-
ever, is dependent on the type of relationship that exists 
between the company and the stakeholder (Obigbemi, 
Iyoha, & Ojeka, 2015). Accounting, which is also referred to 
as the language of business, informs the various stakehold-
ers of a business the summary of all activities that transpired 
within the business entity during the reporting period in a 
quantitative manner (Amernic & Craig, 2009; Tsai & Chiou, 
2009). Accounting is also the channel of communication in 
a business enterprise through which the managers of the 
business relate with the owners and other stakeholders in the 
business serving as a medium through which stewardship 
and accountability are reported (Amernic & Craig, 2009). 
Accounting information, however, is expected to fulfill the 
purpose of minimizing uncertainty about the state of affairs 
in the reporting entity (Akintoye, 2008).
The stakeholders of a business enterprise who are the 
users of its financial reports (Appalachian, 2006; Freeman, 
Wicks, & Parmar, 2004; Murya, 2010; Universal College of 
Accountancy, 2004) make use of the reports for several pur-
poses. The contents of these reports, however, are financial 
data, which, if properly analyzed, are transformed into 
accounting information that is used for economic decision 
making by the users (Murya, 2010; Tsai & Chiou, 2009). The 
users of accounting information can be divided into internal 
and external users (Koornhof, 1998). The internal users are 
those who make decisions directly affecting the internal 
operations of an enterprise, whereas the external users are 
those who use the financial and nonfinancial information of 
a business enterprise to make decisions concerning their rela-
tionship with the enterprise on whether to continue, with-
draw, or improve on their present level of business 
relationship (Koornhof, 1998; Universal College of 
Accountancy, 2004). Both groups benefit by receiving the 
needed information to make economic decision (Sori, 2009; 
Tsai & Chiou, 2009).
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Abstract
The board structure of an organization gives an overview of the standard of such organization, which also influences its public 
image. This study attempts to evaluate the role board structure plays in curtailing earnings management practices in Nigerian 
companies. This study sampled the data of 137 quoted companies in Nigeria for a period of 8 years (2003-2010). Earnings 
management was measured using the magnitude of the discretionary accruals as estimated by the performance matched 
modified Jones model. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression technique was used to measure the research model as 
well as the Pearson moment correlation coefficient. The study shows that there is a significant relationship between board 
structure and earnings management practices in Nigeria. The study shows that there is a negative significant relationship 
between board size, gender, and board composition with earnings management; also, there is a positive significant relationship 
between board meeting and earnings management practices in Nigeria. There is a positive nonsignificant relationship between 
the presence of a remuneration committee and the dualization of CEO and chairman positions with earnings management 
practices in Nigeria. This study recommends that regulators at all levels should enforce the preparation and publication of 
financial reports by companies operating in Nigeria.
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However, the ability of the financial report to meet the 
needs of its users is what informs its usefulness and the level 
of reliability placed on it by its users; thus, when a financial 
report is unable to meet the needs of its users, it becomes of 
low value (Accounting Aisle, 2011; Hand, 2003; Kothari, 
Ramanna, & Skinner, 2010; Stanford Graduate School of 
Business, 2005; Uadiale, 2012). The value of financial data 
is subject to the quality of report presented, which is subject 
to the rate at which the users rely on the information it gives 
(Kothari et al., 2010). If the content of the financial data is 
faulty, it gives a wrong picture of the business enterprise, 
which also affects the level of reliance placed on it by the 
users and finally faulting the credibility of the financial 
report (Uadiale, 2012). The reliability of accounting infor-
mation may affect its relevance to the market in determining 
the firm value (Otusanya & Lauwo, 2010).
To enhance the value of financial statements, the informa-
tion needs of the various users must be met (Revsine, 1969). 
However, due to the numerous users and their divergent 
interest in the company, the manager is faced with the chal-
lenge of reporting to meet the information needs of all. The 
external users of accounting information are creditors, inves-
tors, financial analysts, government, general public, and so 
on, while on the list of the primary users of the financial 
reports are the shareholders, employees, and the managers, 
who have divergent interests (Ireland, 2005). The users of 
the financial reports all deduce various information from the 
reports that should satisfy the needs of all the users; thus, the 
managers are faced with the challenge of how the reports 
should be prepared, which is because of the divergent inter-
ests of the various users. In an attempt to meet the divergent 
needs of the users of financial report, the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), alongside other regulatory 
documents such as the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(1990) as amended, The National Accounting Standards 
(now Financial Reporting Act (2011) Bank, and other 
Financial Institution Act (for financial institutions), and so 
on, that serve as guidelines for the preparation of financial 
reports were adopted in Nigeria.
In the preparation of the financial reports, the managers of 
companies, who serve as the agents of the other stakeholders, 
may prepare the reports in a way that best suit them, and their 
decision-making process, which may not necessarily be to 
the advantage of the other stakeholders. For example, a man-
ager in a bid to boost production of the next season may 
decide to increase the company’s retained earnings at the det-
riment of the ordinary stock shareholder who is interested in 
receiving high dividend at the end of the period, while the 
manager may also decide to go for bank loan, which may 
also affect the collateral base of the debenture holder. The 
managers, because of their privileged position, may exert 
immense control over the running of the company, the allo-
cation of resources on behalf of shareholders as well as con-
trolling the information to be disclosed to capital providers. 
Self-interested motive, such as the reduction in the cost of 
research and development to increase book profit as well as 
the use of other creative accounting measures, to boost 
bonus, and commission, induces managers to divert firms’ 
resources to activities that are detrimental to the objective of 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth (Ramly & Rashid, 2010). 
This act is as a result of the use of the GAAP that requires the 
use of judgment, or discretion on the part of the manager 
(accountant), in the preparation of the financial reports 
(Bello, 2011; Joseph & Atul, 2007). At times, the exercise of 
accounting discretion allows managers to manage earnings 
by shifting revenue or expense items from one accounting 
period to another accounting period. When this happens, it 
reduces the total expenses for the reporting year, thereby 
increasing profit; also, when revenue is anticipated in a 
future date, it may be recorded in the current year thereby 
increasing profit. When there is also a sign of loss in a future 
date, current year revenue may be delayed and recorded in a 
future date. These acts and many more can therefore be 
referred to as earnings management. In the case of the Enron 
Saga, which is a typical example of corporate failure, it was 
identified that the fall was as a result of the failure of the 
board of directors and management to take responsibility for 
the risks inherent in the company’s business plan, and the use 
of the special purpose entities and related forms of structured 
finance, thus a misuse of off balance sheet financing as well 
as conflict of interest which led to the enrichment of some 
officers of the company (Deakin & Konzelmann, 2004).
Earnings management, therefore, can be referred to as an 
act of maximizing the loopholes in the financial reporting 
laws, to maximize personal, group, or organizational objec-
tives at the detriment of another group of individuals who 
may be directly or indirectly affected by such decisions. 
Earnings management can take the form of creative account-
ing such as recording anticipated sales in the books as turn-
over for the present year, as well as the reduction in the cost 
of research and development. Earnings management could 
also involve the use of discretionary accruals, the accumula-
tion of accrued expenses in the bid to give a different picture 
of the financial well-being of the company. It is the use of 
deceitful actions by the preparers of the financial reports, 
which may be at the detriment of the other stakeholders, 
which is the deviation of management from shareholders’ 
interest (Murya, 2010). One example of management’s devi-
ation from shareholders’ interests is the management of earn-
ings with the use of accounting accruals (Beaudoin, 2008; 
Bugshan, 2005; Murya, 2010). For example, such techniques 
may include altering (i.e., either delaying or accelerating) 
actual cash flow expenditures such as advertising and 
research and development. (When advertising and research 
and development expenditures are delayed, this will, how-
ever, reduce the total expenditure for the year, thus increas-
ing profit on the short run, but will affect the business profit 
on the long run.) This type of earnings management is called 
the opportunistic earnings management, whereby the man-
ager seeks to mislead investors by pursuing his personal 
Obigbemi et al. 3
interest of increasing incentives such as bonus and commis-
sion, which may be a function of reported profit at the detri-
ment of the other stakeholders, who are interested in the 
survival and long-term profitability of the company (Liming, 
Charlotte, & Shannon, 2005).
In the year 2003, the Nigerian Code of Corporate 
Governance was published, with the expectation that adher-
ence to the contents of the code by Nigerian companies will 
increase the level of confidence in the economy (Adegbite, 
2012a, 2012b), as a result of the increase in confidence 
placed on the financial reports of companies operating in the 
country, which thereafter translates into increase in the rate 
of investment in the economy (Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, 
& Stapleton, 2012). Therefore, there is a need to identify the 
various factors that may affect earnings management prac-
tices in Nigeria with respect to the role corporate governance 
plays in its reduction.
Review of Literature
Earnings management is a topical issue that has been widely 
reviewed and evaluated from different perspectives and 
dimensions in accounting literature as well as documenta-
ries. It has received great attention globally, and its effect on 
the level of reliability is placed on the financial reports of 
companies (Beaudoin, 2008; Bugshan, 2005; Murya, 2010; 
Uadiale, 2012). However, there seems to be dearth of infor-
mation on earnings management practices in Nigeria and the 
Nigerian firms (Bello, 2011; Okoye & Alao, 2008), though 
different questions have been raised on the reasons for cor-
porate failures in the Nigerian environment (Anaro, 2011) 
even when reported earnings look vibrant and portray that of 
a going concern (Ogunwusi & Eazee, 2011).
Many preparers of financial reports have been accused of 
engaging in various forms of earnings management prac-
tices, in a bid to either secure their job by giving the users of 
the reports what they want to see and not necessarily report 
the situation in the company (Bello, 2011; Tsai & Chiou, 
2009), which is as a result of the divergent interest of the 
various users of the accounting information and the resultant 
effect of which is the reduction in the value placed on finan-
cial reports by the users of the report (Okoye & Alao, 2008). 
In an attempt to reduce this trend, the code of corporate gov-
ernance was published in 2003 in Nigeria, by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in conjunction with the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), the document that is 
believed to bridge the gap between the information need of 
the various users of the financial reports. The code looked at 
the ways by which companies could be managed in such a 
way that the interest of the various stakeholders in the com-
pany is considered in the management of the company, the 
preparation of the reports, and the presentation of the reports 
for the various users (SEC, 2003).
In developed countries, research has shown that corporate 
governance reduces the earnings management practices 
carried out in companies, giving greater credence to the 
financial reports of companies; however, the opposite hap-
pens to be the case in Nigeria, where the code was published 
in 2003 and quoted companies have been mandated to adhere 
to the contents of the code. A close look at the Nigerian busi-
ness environment shows that from 2003 to date, there have 
been several cases of company fold up and financial scandals 
in Nigeria (Anaro, 2011; Ighomwenghian, 2010; 
Microfinance Africa, 2010; Ogunwusi & Eazee, 2011; 
Onwuamaeze, 2008). This, however, poses a question on the 
efficacy of the code of corporate governance in Nigeria and 
its effect on earnings management practice. Is corporate gov-
ernance a variable responsible for the discovery of the vari-
ous scandals; has it improved financial reporting integrity; 
and what is the extent of compliance to the code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria?
Accruals Management
Accruals refer to the difference between income from con-
tinuing operations and cash flow from operations resulting 
from accounting rules and journal entries for the recognition 
of revenues and expenses (Dharan, 2003). According to 
Dechow (1994), accounting accruals is a product of account-
ing entries and management estimations having no cash flow 
effect. Accrual management is done easily through account-
ing decision and does not require the creation of a new busi-
ness transaction. It is usually done by one manager or a group 
of managers. According to Dharan (2003), there is a common 
practice in many organizations known as Garden-variety 
earnings management where a manager may increase or 
decrease the levels of accounting accruals (such as accounts 
receivable, inventory, accounts payable, deferred revenue, 
accrued liability, and prepaid expenses) to reach a desired 
profit.
Accrual management is not a common area for account-
ing researchers but still remains a very significant part of 
financial engineering, which depletes the worth of an organi-
zation. There is a need to secure control over accrual man-
agement and the manipulations of accruals, but the methods 
of these manipulations are still being researched into. 
According to (Iyoha, 2011), the higher the index of accruals 
of companies, the poorer is the quality of accounting infor-
mation supplied by the reporting company; thus, the closer 
the accrual index to zero, the better is the quality of financial 
reporting. However, in a country like Nigeria, where the 
accrual concept is used in financial reporting and so many 
companies operate on credit basis, how easy is it then for 
Nigerian companies to have an accrual index of zero?
Discretionary Accruals
Discretionary accruals are adjustments to cash flows selected 
by the manager to affect reported income (Healy, 1985). 
They are those accruals that are reported by the managers of 
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a business enterprise voluntarily and not as stipulated by law 
or as regulated by standards. Discretionary accruals have 
been seen in literature as a major source of earnings manage-
ment (Beaudoin, 2008; Bugshan, 2005; Hutchinson & 
Leung, 2007; Murya, 2010). The impact of discretionary 
accruals on the information content of earnings is subject to 
debate as the disclosure manipulations could enhance the 
value relevance of reported earnings of a company (Bugshan, 
2005). The most popular discretionary accruals models are 
the Healy model, DeAngelo model, the Jones model, the 
modified Jones model, the industry model, and the Cross-
Sectional Jones model as well as the performance matched 
discretionary accruals. The Healy model is the maiden work 
for the separation of accruals into discretionary and nondis-
cretionary accruals giving the conclusion that the discretion-
ary part of accruals indicates earnings management trend by 
companies, identifying some of the shortcomings of the 
Healy model. DeAngelo model, in an attempt to correct the 
shortcoming, propounded another model for the separation 
of accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary.
Jones, while reviewing the DeAngelo model, propounded 
a model, which received wide acceptance, whereby regress-
ing total accruals and separating it into discretionary and 
nondiscretionary accruals. The Jones model was not without 
limitation, as it was identified that the model did not consider 
the use of accounts receivables by managers in managing 
earnings; this, therefore, led to the adoption of the modified 
Jones model. The modified Jones model was, however, com-
plemented with the performance of companies in an attempt 
to consider the investment pattern as well as the effect of 
performance on accruals and earnings management, which 
resulted in the adoption of the performance matched modi-
fied Jones model (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005).
Discretionary accrual is that part of total accruals that is 
more susceptible to manipulation by managers (Huang & 
Liu, 2011). Discretionary accruals are easier to manipulate 
but difficult to be detected (Tsai & Chiou, 2009). Managers 
have some scope to manage reported profits by the use of 
discretionary accruals. Although these accruals “reverse” in 
future years, managers may have incentives to move profits 
from one year to the next (Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2002). The 
use of discretionary accruals as an earnings management tool 
arises as a result of managers’ freedom to exercise judgment 
in the preparation of their financial report. However, it is dif-
ficult for researchers to distinguish the discretionary portion 
of total accruals used for manipulation by the managers.
To resolve this phenomenon, prior studies have proposed 
a variety of models for the separation of accruals into discre-
tionary and nondiscretionary accruals estimation models to 
estimate the discretionary components of accruals (Kothari 
et al., 2005; Murya, 2010; Tsai & Chiou, 2009). In literature, 
it has been said that managers can use their discretion on 
certain accruals to manipulate accounting earnings, which is 
as a result of the loopholes in the accounting principles and 
guidelines for the preparation of financial reports. Thus, 
discretionary accruals are commonly used by researchers as 
the proxy for earnings management.
Nondiscretionary Accruals
Nondiscretionary accrual is a mandatory expense/asset that 
is recorded within the accounting system that is yet to be 
realized. An example of this would be payroll taxes. 
Nondiscretionary accruals are the obligatory transactions in 
the books of account that cash is yet to be realized. These are 
the compulsory disclosures according to the relevant 
accounting standards of the home country of the reporting 
company. The nondiscretionary component of a financial 
report reflects the company’s business conditions (such as 
growth and the length of the operating cycle) that naturally 
create and destroy accruals (Murya, 2010). There are many 
approaches used in an attempt to estimate the nondiscretion-
ary accrual proxy, but estimating the nondiscretionary com-
ponent of accruals typically involves a discretionary model 
(Bugshan, 2005).
Earnings Management
Earnings management is a deliberate attempt to arrive at a 
desired level of earnings using different means, which is con-
sidered an unethical practice (Bello, 2011). Earnings man-
agement can take many forms and include numerous deceitful 
actions as a result of managers’ use of judgment in financial 
reporting. Earnings management extends to cover manipula-
tions other than accounting choices; thus, the implications of 
accounting choice to achieve a goal are consistent with the 
idea of earnings management (Bugshan, 2005; Murya, 2010). 
Earnings management, however, involves the preparation of 
financial reports in accordance to what correlates with the 
effort of the managers, such as enhances the worth of the 
company and that of the accountants. The flexibility of 
the accounting regulations makes it easy for managers to 
manage earnings (Okoye & Alao, 2008). According to Gunny 
(2005), earnings management can be classified into three 
categories: fraudulent accounting, accruals management, 
and real earnings management. Fraudulent accounting 
involves accounting choices that violate GAAP; accruals 
management involves the use of discretion in the presenta-
tion of accruals elements in the financial reports; whereas 
real earnings management involves the use of discretion in 
changing the regular operational activities of the organiza-
tion to achieve certain objectives.
The nature of accrual accounting gives managers a great 
deal of discretion in determining the actual earnings a firm 
reports in any given period. The most common practice is to 
manipulate the timing of expenditures such as advertising 
expenses or outlays for research and development. There are 
two types of accrual-based earnings management—opportu-
nistic and informative earnings management. Opportunistic 
earnings management means that managers seek to mislead 
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investors by pursuing the management’s interests (Tsai & 
Chiou, 2009). This type of earnings management is engaged 
in by managers to achieve personal objectives at the detri-
ment of the organizational objectives and that of other stake-
holders. The informative type of earnings management aims 
at enhancing the value of the firm, through the managers, by 
revealing to investors their expectations about the firm’s 
future cash flows (Murya, 2010).
Literature on opportunistic earnings management origi-
nated from Healy (1985), when it was found that managers 
use accruals to strategically manipulate bonus income 
(Murya, 2010). If managers believe that the board views any 
increase in earnings positively, they may act opportunisti-
cally by opting for income-increasing accounting policies. 
Earnings management, however, may also be informative in 
nature, whereby aiming at maximizing the value of the firm, 
which involves the use of discretion by the managers in the 
revelation of the private expectations of investors about the 
firm’s future cash flows, which could boost the company’s 
public image, thereby allowing the forces of demand and 
supply play a major role in increasing the value of the com-
pany’s shares. Under this form of earnings management, 
stockholders gain because it is used to signal the manager’s 
private information (Murya, 2010).
In a study conducted by Robert and Seybert (2009), it was 
concluded that stock price as well as general reputation con-
cerns are the primary motives for managers’ earnings man-
agement attempts. They further stated that other motives 
such as debt covenants, bonus compensation, and taxes play 
secondary roles in earnings management practices. Managers 
also prefer earning management methods that are not easily 
detected such as alterations of estimates and allocations in 
areas where accounting standards are imprecise such as 
change in investment choices (Robert & Seybert, 2009).
Ethical Issues in Earnings Management
Ethical earnings management practices include the use of 
derivative securities to edge business against risk, whereas 
unethical earning management practices include accrual man-
agement, that is, artificial shifting of expenses between peri-
ods. Earnings management can also be practiced through the 
modification of the useful lives of depreciable assets, change 
of estimated receivables. Firms tend to use earnings manage-
ment to improve their financial numbers and subsequently 
reinforce compensation. Earnings management has been seen 
to be prevalent in countries with weak legal enforcement sys-
tems (Okoye & Alao, 2008). The flexibility inherent in the 
GAAP used in the preparation of financial statements has 
made it easy for preparers of financial reports to engage in 
unethical practices, which is as a result of the freedom enjoyed 
by the financial managers to select from accounting alterna-
tives and methods (Bello, 2011; Joseph & Atul, 2007). Thus, 
this flexibility is what leads to the use of discretion by manag-
ers in the allocation of accruals in financial reporting, which 
therefore increases discretionary accruals as well as earnings 
management practices by managers.
Earnings Management and Accounting 
Regulations
Close enforcement of the accounting regulations and the 
enactment of workable laws have been said to be major tools 
for the reduction of earnings management practices in 
Nigeria (Okoye & Alao, 2008); liberal accounting law has 
been said to create lots of opportunities for managers to 
actively engage in earnings management (Van, 2002).
In a study conducted in China by Chen, Lee, and Li 
(2008), it was observed that with rigid rule-based account-
ing, the listed firms have limited instruments for earnings 
management, whereas Shaomin, David, and Michael (2011) 
noted that in mature economies like the United States with 
considerable market pressure on managers to show positive 
earnings, the practice occurs frequently and tends toward an 
upward adjustment of reported earnings over actual profits. 
Xiao, Chi-Wen, and Jing (2008) discovered that there is col-
lusion between local government and listed firms in earnings 
management; it was discovered that this exists mainly in 
firms controlled by local governments, all in a bid to avoid 
the central government regulations.
According to Masako, Hamid, and Shahrokh (1998), 
although Japanese managers manipulate reported earnings to 
appear more profitable, the cost of the manipulation is much 
higher for Japanese managers due to a high level of confor-
mity between financial reporting and tax reporting. This is as a 
result of the high tax regulation that exists in the country, com-
pared with their U.S.-based and Nigeria-based counterparts, 
which, in a bid to increase reported profit, may result in an 
increase in tax liability of the companies. The stringent tax 
laws in a country like Japan, however, make its earnings man-
agement approach different from that adopted by Nigerian 
companies, as any attempt by the Japanese companies to 
increase profit before tax may result in high tax liability, which 
although exists in Nigeria, but due to the lapses in the Nigerian 
tax law, Nigerian companies engage in tax-avoidance 
practices maximizing the benefits in the loopholes of the tax 
laws. Multinational firms with extensive operations in tax 
havens manage earnings more than other firms (Dyreng, 
Hanlon, & Maydew, 2012) that are not multinationals or do 
not have subsidiaries in countries with less stringent laws.
Real Earnings Management
This is the earnings management that involves the use of dis-
cretion by the managers to achieve a specific objective with 
respect to change in normal business activity (Masahiro, 
Fumihiko, & Tomoyasu, 2013). In a study conducted by 
Gunny (2005), it was suggested that real earnings manage-
ment activities are associated with an economically signifi-
cant decline in subsequent operating performance. This, 
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therefore, means that real earnings management is informed 
by the performance of the companies that engaged in it.
In a study conducted on 38 countries, it was discovered 
that real earnings management is preferred over accrual-
based earnings management in countries with stronger inves-
tor protection (Masahiro et al., 2013). However, because of 
the nature of the Nigerian country with respect to investor 
protection and the loose regulatory system, this study will be 
adopting the accrual-based earnings management.
Corporate Governance
Companies have gained deeper understanding of how good 
corporate governance contributes to their competitiveness. 
Investors, especially collective investment institutions and 
pension funds acting in a fiduciary capacity, have realized 
that they have a role to play in ensuring good corporate gov-
ernance practices, thereby underpinning the value of their 
investments. Economies all over the world are now inter-
ested in corporate governance, with the understanding that it 
goes beyond the interest of shareholders and the performance 
of individual companies, but the entire economy. Therefore, 
corporate governance is important to broad and growing seg-
ments of the entire population. As companies play a pivotal 
role in the economic development of countries and reliance 
on companies has increased, there is a need for good corpo-
rate governance (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development [OECD], 2004).
Corporate governance is affected by the relationships 
among participants in the governance system. Controlling 
shareholders, which may be individuals, family holdings, 
bloc alliances, or other corporations acting through a hold-
ing company or cross shareholdings, can significantly influ-
ence corporate behavior. As owners of equity, institutional 
investors are increasingly demanding a voice in corporate 
governance in some markets. Individual shareholders usu-
ally do not seek to exercise governance rights but may be 
highly concerned about obtaining fair treatment from con-
trolling shareholders and management. Creditors play an 
important role in a number of governance systems and can 
serve as external monitors over corporate performance. 
Employees and other stakeholders play an important role in 
contributing to the long-term success and performance of 
the corporation, while governments establish the overall 
institutional and legal framework for corporate governance 
(OECD, 2004).
As a result of the reported scandals, the highly publicized 
corporate failures worldwide, and the increasing concern of 
the global community on the issues of corporate governance, 
there has been a growing consensus that corporate gover-
nance, which has been defined as the way and manner in 
which the affairs of companies are conducted by those 
charged with the responsibility of managing the company 
(SEC, 2003), has a positive link to national growth and 
development. Several Codes of Corporate Practices and 
Conduct have been fashioned out and are in use in various 
jurisdictions.
The presence of an effective corporate governance sys-
tem, within an individual company and across an economy 
as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence that is 
necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy. 
As a result, the cost of capital is lower, and firms are encour-
aged to use resources more efficiently, thereby making cor-
porate governance one key element in improving economic 
efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor confi-
dence. Corporate governance involves a set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its sharehold-
ers, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also pro-
vides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives 
and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the board 
and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests 
of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring underpinning growth (OECD, 2004).
As a result of the identified benefits of good corporate 
governance, developed and developing countries have pub-
lished several codes to resolve the corporate governance 
issues as a result of the identified challenges in companies. 
However, there is no single model of good corporate gover-
nance, but some common elements have been identified 
(OECD, 2004). Realizing the need to align with the 
International Best Practices, the SEC in collaboration with 
the Corporate Affairs Commission inaugurated a 17-member 
Committee on June 15, 2000, in Nigeria, which looks into 
the enactment of a code of corporate governance in line with 
the international expectation. The Committee, as headed by 
Atedo Peterside, was mandated to identify the weaknesses in 
the current corporate governance practice in Nigeria as at 
that date and fashion out the necessary changes that would 
improve the Nigerian corporate governance practices.
Membership of the Committee was selected to cut across 
all sectors of the economy including members of profes-
sional organizations, organized private sector, and regulatory 
agencies. The Committee submitted a draft Code, which was 
published in several newspapers and was further reviewed at 
three locations across the Country, namely, Lagos, Abuja, 
and Port Harcourt. An extensive exposure that was designed 
to elicit stakeholders’ input was sent out to various stake-
holders like managers, bankers, investors, regulators, and so 
on, before the Code was finalized and approved by the 
Boards of the SEC in 2003, being the regulatory authority of 
the Capital Market, and the Corporate Affairs Commission 
being the regulatory authority of Companies in Nigeria as the 
Code of Best Practices for Corporate Governance.
The Nigerian SEC, as well as the Corporate Affairs 
Commission, is expected to enforce due compliance or oth-
erwise of the provisions of the Code in the treatment of issues 
brought before them. However, all other regulators and self-
regulatory organizations are expected to ensure that their 
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rules and regulations incorporate relevant aspects of the 
Code. The Central Bank of Nigeria mandated all banks in 
Nigeria to fully adhere to the content of the code, with differ-
ent control measures set up to enforce full compliance.
Literature has shown that several variables can be used in 
the measurement of the strength of corporate governance in 
a company. The impact of the various variables and their 
effect of the organizations have been explored in literature 
and conclusions reached thereby. This study, however, will 
be considering some of these variables as reviewed in litera-
ture and their informed effect on the governance structure of 
any company.
Board Composition in Companies
Research on board composition and board leadership struc-
ture has also been dominated by a focus on company perfor-
mance (Dally & Dalton, 1999), which is consistent with the 
institutional investment community’s demands for more 
independent board structures. The general notion is that 
boards with higher proportion of nonexecutive/independence 
directors are generally objective and independent in their 
monitoring function (Bello, 2011). The Nigerian Code of 
Corporate Governance stipulates some requirements for the 
composition of board members in companies. The Code stip-
ulates that the board should be composed in such a way as to 
ensure diversity of experience without compromising com-
patibility, integrity, availability, and independence. It states 
that the board should comprise of a mix of executive and 
nonexecutive directors, to be headed by a chairman of the 
board, and the composition of the board should not exceed 
15 persons or be less than five persons in total. Members of 
the board should be individuals with upright personal char-
acteristics and relevant core competences, preferably with a 
record of tangible achievement, knowledge on board mat-
ters, a sense of accountability, integrity, and commitment to 
the task of corporate governance and institution building, 
while also having an entrepreneurial bias.
According to Duztas (2008), boards are important bound-
ary spanners, as they can be used as a mechanism to form 
links with the external environment and achieve interorgani-
zational linkages, such as the appointment of outside direc-
tors and board interlocks, which can be used to manage 
environmental contingencies. Directors who are prestigious 
in their professions and communities can give timely infor-
mation to executives and also use that information as a chan-
nel for marketing the brand of the company. Also, with the 
inclusion of external nonexecutive directors, individuals with 
good managerial skills can be brought on board, which may 
enhance the oversight functions of the board as a whole. The 
Code of Corporate Governance is an attempt to ensure that 
the executive directors do not use their power to run the 
affairs of the company in a way that is not to the advantage of 
other stakeholders in the company. A board of directors with 
more executive directors than the nonexecutive directors is 
seen as an overbearing board with the assumption that the 
executive directors will lord major decisions on the entire 
board, which may boost insider dealings and unethical prac-
tices in the company. However, the code states that an equal 
mix of executive and independent nonexecutive directors is 
expected to have an independent board.
Duality occurs when the same person occupies both the 
CEO and chairman positions on the board. Past studies test 
the chairman’s independence and the concentration of power 
on the board. It is argued in the governance literature that the 
objectivity and quality of board oversight may suffer if the 
CEO also chairs the board. Duality of position is envisaged 
to cause centralization of power in a company, which can 
result in the CEO being able to exercise excessive influence 
over the board by setting board agendas, managing meetings, 
and controlling the flow of information to its members 
(Murya, 2010). The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 
stipulates that the board of a company should not be domi-
nated by an individual, while responsibilities at the top of a 
company should be well defined. It further emphasized that 
the position of the chairman and CEO should ideally be sepa-
rated and held by different persons with a note that the com-
bination of the two positions in an individual represents an 
undue concentration of power. The Code, however, gave a 
clause to the expectation by stating that “In exceptional cir-
cumstances where the position of the Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer are combined in one individual, there 
should be a strong non-executive independent director as 
Vice Chairman of the Board” (SEC, 2003, p. 5).
Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Management
Earnings are the income and input generated by an organiza-
tion, which are retained or distributed by the company. When 
such are retained, they are, therefore, used in the generation 
of additional revenue. Earnings management therefore can 
be referred to as the process of achieving financial and mana-
gerial (personal or sectional) goals by planning and control-
ling the financial reporting and accounting activities of an 
organization effectively and efficiently. This may, however, 
have an effect on the survival of the business if not checked 
and controlled. Healy (1985) found that managers use accru-
als to strategically manipulate bonus income. This phenom-
enon may be attributable to manufacturing companies and 
companies that compensate for work done and give commis-
sion based on the level of output.
Past researches have, however, shown that there is a nega-
tive level of relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings management (Alzoubi & Selamat, 2012; Bugshan, 
2005; Gulzar, Wuhan, & Wang, 2011; Murya, 2010). This 
study, therefore, aims at evaluating the effectiveness of the 
Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance and the level of 
relationship that exists between corporate governance and 
earnings management in Nigeria. Corporate governance is 
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affected by the relationships among participants in the gover-
nance system (OECD, 2004).
Earnings Management and Board 
Composition
The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance stipulates that 
every company incorporated in Nigeria and listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) is expected to have board of 
directors, who are the individuals nominated by the share-
holders of the business to coordinate the activities of the 
managers and other principal officers in the company. The 
board of directors is expected to control the excesses of 
the managers and also represent the shareholders in the com-
pany. A study conducted by Gulzar et al. (2011) shows that 
board of director’s characteristics are significantly associ-
ated with the earnings management and that the presence of 
female directors in the board helps to reduce the level of 
earnings management.
Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau (2001) observed that 
effective board composition helps in constraining earnings 
management in companies. The level of board independence 
and the mix of board members of the board, to comprise of 
executive and non executive directors has been the focus of 
literature with respect to earnings management in companies 
and mostly the corporate governance literature. Epps and 
Ismail (2009) identified that firms with annually elected 
boards, small size boards, have more negative discretionary 
accruals. However, firms with 75% to 90% independent 
board or firms with a board size of between nine and 12 have 
higher positive discretionary accruals. This, therefore, is a 
pointer to that fact the higher the board size, the lower the 
earnings management and vice versa. Ghosh, Marra, and 
Moon (2010), however, found that earnings management 
does not vary with board composition. This study, however, 
aims to find out the type of relationship that exists between 
earnings management and board composition.
Earnings Management and Frequency 
of Board Meetings
The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance stipulates the 
required number of times members of the audit committee are 
expected to meet in a year. It states that the members of the 
board must meet at least once in a quarter, which means they 
are expected to meet at least 4 times in a year for the board to 
be effective in the discharge of its duties. Past research shows 
that the frequency of board meetings has an effect on earnings 
management trend in companies (Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 
2003). Gulzar et al. (2011) found that if the frequency of 
board meetings is more, then the value of discretionary accru-
als is lower; they stated that higher frequency of board meet-
ings will improve the board monitoring. Sarkar, Sarkar, and 
Sen (2006) argued that it is not board independence, but board 
quality that is important for earnings management; they fur-
ther identified that diligent boards are associated with lower 
earnings manipulation, whereas boards that have large num-
ber of multiple directors exhibit higher earnings management. 
This, therefore, connotes that board that meets often and dis-
charges its duty diligently and effectively may help in the 
reduction of earnings management.
Earnings Management and Duality of 
Chairman and CEO Positions
The chairman of a company is an individual who is respon-
sible for the effective operation of the Board; he sees to it 
that the board members are effectively constituted and that 
they carry out their responsibility as expected, whereas the 
CEO is an individual who is responsible for the effective 
operation of the day-to-day activities of the company. These 
two have power to make major decisions in the company that 
may affect the company positively or negatively (Obigbemi, 
Mukoro, & Obamiro, 2016). In light of this, the Code of 
Corporate Governance therefore states that these positions 
must not be occupied by an individual as this may lead to the 
investure of too much power in an individual, which may be 
harmful to the company and other stakeholders in the 
company.
In a study conducted by Saleh, Iskandar, and Rahmat 
(2005) in Malaysia, it was discovered that there is a positive 
level of relationship between earnings management and 
duality of chairman and CEO position; thus, it means when 
the two positions are handled by an individual, there is every 
likelihood that earnings management practice will take place. 
A study conducted in China by Sarkar et al. (2006) discov-
ered that CEO duality and presence of controlling sharehold-
ers on the board increase earnings management. Gulzar et al. 
(2011) also found that there is a positive relationship between 
earnings management and the duality of CEO position and 
chairman position. This, however, shows that the dualization 
of the two positions makes it possible for concentration of 
power, which may aid earnings management practices in 
organizations.
Generally, few studies examine the role of corporate gov-
ernance on earnings management practices in Nigeria, and 
few have used primary data (Uadiale, 2012). Due to gap in 
literature with respect to board structure and earnings man-
agement practices in developing economies, this study 
examines the role of board structure on earnings manage-
ment practices in a developing economy like Nigeria, using 
the financial reports of sampled companies listed on the 
stock exchange of the country over a period of 2003 to 2010.
Method
This study adopts the empirical and analytical method of 
research that involves the evaluation of a subject matter over 
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a period of time to draw inference for decision making and 
conclusion. The study examines the effect of board structure 
on the earnings management practices of companies in 
Nigeria. The population of this study comprises of all listed 
companies on the NSE. The annual reports of the NSE show 
that a total of 217 companies were quoted from 27 sectors as 
at December 2010. For a given company to qualify in the 
sample, it must have submitted its financial information 
within the period of the study. The sample size was derived 
using the Slovin’s sampling technique formula:
n
N
Ne
=
+1 2
,
where n = sample size, N = total population/sample frame 
(217), and e = error tolerance (0.05).
Using the above formula, with a sample frame of 217 
companies, the sample size came to 141 companies that meet 
the data-gathering criteria, albeit, 137 companies were sam-
pled, which represent 97% of the calculated sample size; 137 
companies were sampled because of inability to access the 
financial reports of some of the companies for the study 
period. The data retrieved from their financial reports were 
used for data analysis. However, the unavailability of the 
required data of some years for some companies made the 
panel data an unbalanced one and was treated as such.
A test for heteroscedasticity of the data shows that the 
data are heteroscedastic; this may be as a result of the varia-
tion in the number of samples per company as well as the 
variation in the size of the sampled companies. This is 
because this study did not separate the companies according 
to their sizes. To resolve the problem of heteroscedasticity, in 
accordance with the suggestions of Kim and Imai (2012) on 
the correction of heteroscedastic data, weight was applied, 
which gave rise to the use of the weighted fixed effect regres-
sion method. Thus, the weight was applied based on the indi-
vidual company characteristics of the sampled companies. 
This is to ensure that the individual company characteristics 
are considered appropriately as they relate to earnings man-
agement practices and corporate governance variables as 
measured by the study.
The weighted fixed effect regression was used to estimate 
the level of relationship that exists between earnings man-
agement and corporate governance practices in Nigeria. 
After the earnings management equation was solved using 
the performance adjusted modified Jones model, the residual 
of this model was regressed against the corporate governance 
data gathered.
Model Specification
This study established the type of relationship that exists 
between corporate governance variables and earnings man-
agement practices in Nigeria. This study anticipated that a 
negative relationship exists between corporate governance 
and earnings management, which means that as corporate 
governance increases, earnings management practices reduce 
and vice versa.
Y f X= ( ) ,
where Y is the dependent variable and X is the independent 
variable.
Following this explanation, with Earnings Management 
(EEM) as the dependent variable and Corporate Governance 
Indices as the independent variables, this relationship can be 
represented as follows:
 EEM = ( )f COG ,  (1)
where EEM is Earnings Management, the dependent vari-
able, proxied by the absolute value of the residual from the 
performance matched modified Jones Model; and COG is 
Corporate Governance Indices, the independent variables, 
which comprise some indicators, namely, Board Structure 
(BodStruc), which is the aggregate of Board Size (BS), 
Remuneration Committee (REMCOM), Gender Diversity 
(GENDER), Duality of Position (DOP), Frequency of Board 
Meetings (BDMEET), and Board Composition 
(BODCOMP).
Equation 1 can thus be splitted into three different mod-
els, measuring the various constructs identified as follows:
 EEM BodStruc= ( )f .  (1.1)
Splitting Equation 3.8 further, we derive Equation 1.2, 
thus
 EEM
BodSize,REMCOM,GENDER,
NDOP,FOBodMeet,BodComp
=





f ,  (1.2)
 EEM
BodSize REMCOM GENDER
NDOP FOBodMeet BodComp
=
+ + +
+ +





f .  (1.3)
Equation 1.3 can be further represented in econometric 
form to represent Model 1:
 
EEM BodSize
REMCOM GENDER NDOP
BodM
it it
it it it
= + +
+ + +
β β
β β β
β
0 1
2 3 4
5 eet BodCompit ite+ +β6 ,
 (1.4)
where EEM = earnings management proxied by the absolute 
value of the residual from the performance matched modified 
Jones model; BodSize = board size; REMCOM = remunera-
tion committee; GENDER = gender diversity; DOP = duality 
of chairman and CEO position; BodMeet = board meeting; 
BodComp = board composition; e = residual; Expected a 
priori = β
1
, β
2
, β
3
, β
5
, β
6
 < 0, β
4
, > 0.
Thus,
β
1
 < 0, implying that the higher the Board Size, the lower the 
earnings management practice;
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β
2
 < 0, implying that the higher the availability of 
Remuneration Committee, the lower the earnings manage-
ment practice;
β
3
 < 0, implying that the higher the Gender Diversity of the 
board, the lower the earnings management practice;
β
4
 > 0, implying that the higher the Dualization of Chairman 
and CEO Position, the higher the earnings management 
practice;
β
5
 < 0, implying that the higher the Frequency of Board 
Meetings, the lower the earnings management practice;
β
6
 < 0, implying that the higher the number of nonexecutive 
board members, the lower the earnings management 
practice.
This expectation is based on past findings that corporate 
governance mechanisms should deter earnings management 
practices in organizations when effectively followed and 
strictly monitored by the regulators (Bello, 2011; Bugshan, 
2005; Murya, 2010).
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the secondary data as gathered 
from the annual reports of sampled companies presenting the 
dependent variable (Discretionary Accruals [DAC]) and the 
independent variables (Corporate Governance Indices) are as 
summarized in Table 1. The table shows that the period 2003 
to 2010 is the study period. The study examined 137 compa-
nies from the 24 sectors of the economy.
Table 1 shows that DAC of all the sampled companies has 
a positive mean of 0.00000871, which means that most of the 
companies have income-increasing discretionary accruals. 
Though there are companies with negative discretionary 
accruals, which means some companies have income reduc-
ing discretionary accruals. Income-increasing discretionary 
accruals are used by managers when earnings are below the 
forecast, whereas the income-decreasing discretionary accru-
als are used when premanaged earnings are higher than the 
forecast to defer these returns for future reports as identified 
by Murya (2010).
Correlation
Below is the correlation matrix for the model (see Table 2):
EEM BodSize
REMCOM GENDER NDOP
BodM
it it
it it it
= + +
+ + +
β β
β β β
β
0 1
2 3 4
5 eet BodCompit ite+ +β6 .
The correlation matrix as presented above shows that 
there is no high correlation between the dependent variable 
(Earnings Management), the independent variables, and the 
control variable. Also, there is low correlation between the 
independent variables and the control variable. Thus, this is 
an indication that the regression for the dependent variable 
and the independent variables can be done. Also, it shows 
that the control variable has a good fit.
Test for Heteroscedasticity
Heteroscedasticity is the situation in which variance of resid-
uals is not homogeneous. It changes across groups or waves 
of data. To test for Heteroscedasticity, the Breusch–Pagan 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Item n M SD Minimum Maximum
Year 1,096 2,006.5 2.29334 2,003 2,010
Sectid 1,096 3.24818 7.365506 1 24
Coyid 1,096 69 39.56549 1 137
TotalAsset 747 2.37e+08 1.23e+09 389 2.35e+10
Receivables 739 3.07e+07 1.34e+08 249 1.53e+09
PPE 756 1.07e+08 6.95e+08 58 1.45e+10
ROA 747 0.443113 0.2018449 −2.04132 2.263246
Revchange 756 3.31e+07 1.97e+08 −4.43e+08 2.22e+09
Recchange 748 9,255,988 7.00e+07 −4.02e+08 9.61e+08
A 685 9.05e−06 0.0001122 1.00e−10 0.0025707
β1 685 0.6676163 14.20123 −2.052215 371.6122
β2 685 1.794134 27.30369 0.0000379 640.7399
β3 685 0.0518298 0.1996604 −2.04132 2.263246
Dac 685 8.71e−06 0.0001122 −0.0000123 0.002571
Bodsize 685 9.684672 3.175631 0 23
Bodind 685 0.488292 0.135168 0 0.86
BodMeet 685 0.5824818 0.4935102 0 1
Gender 685 0.0571752 0.0791652 0 0.43
RemCom 685 0.1664234 0.3727324 0 1
Source. Field Study.
Note. PPE = plant, property, and equipment; ROA = return on asset.
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test is used, which is designed to detect any linear form of 
heteroscedasticity. Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg tests the 
null hypothesis that the error variances are all equal versus 
the alternative that the error variances are a multiplicative 
function of one or more variables. The bigger the predicted 
value of Y, the bigger the error variance is. A large chi-square 
would indicate that heteroscedasticity was present.
Below is the result of the analyses of the heteroscedasticity 
of the data:
Heteroscedasticity test
Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity
H
0
: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of dac
χ2(1) = 4,365.51
Prob > χ2 = .0000
The result of the test for heteroscedasticity above shows that 
the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternate hypothesis 
accepted, which means that the data set is heteroscedastic in 
nature. Due to the heteroscedasticity of the data as shown above, 
and in line with the suggestions of Kim and Imai (2012) on the 
correction of heteroscedastic data, weight is applied to the 
regression analysis, and because the data are unbalanced panel 
data, the fixed effect method of regression is used for analysis. 
To this end, the weighted fixed effect regression method was 
used, using the company identifier as the weight; this is as a 
result of the company characteristics, such as size and turnover.
Hypothesis Testing
The research hypothesis is tested using the E-Views 5 statistical 
package for the calculation of the annual residuals, which is the 
discretionary accruals (Earnings Management Measurement); 
the various models as specified in the previous chapter were 
measured using the weighted fixed effect regression with the use 
of the STATA 11 Statistical package for the analyses of the sec-
ondary data, whereas the SPSS 15 is used for the primary data.
Research Hypothesis
H
0
: Board structure does not have a significant effect on earn-
ings management practices of listed companies in Nigeria.
Using Model 1 as formulated in the previous chapter 
where
EEM BodSize
REMCOM GENDER NDOP
BodM
it it
it it it
= + +
+ + +
β β
β β β
β
0 1
2 3 4
5 eet BodCompit ite+ +β6 .
With reference to the model earlier specified for firm perfor-
mance, using return on asset (roa) as a proxy for perfor-
mance. The frequency weight was applied using the company 
weight outlier as a result of varying company size, samples, 
and characteristics. The model is significant at 1% level of 
significance; the regression, therefore, gives the result below 
(see Table 3).
Table 3 shows the result of the test of hypothesis; it shows 
that board structure has a significant effect on earnings manage-
ment practices of listed companies in Nigeria. The result shows 
that board size has a negative and significant effect on earnings 
management practices of Nigerian companies at 1% level of 
significance. This result shows that the higher the board size, the 
lower the earnings management of Nigerian companies.
The result shows that the presence of a remuneration com-
mittee does not have a significant effect on the earnings man-
agement practices of Nigerian companies. However, the 
relationship is positive, which informs that the higher the pres-
ence of the remuneration committee, the higher the earnings 
management practices of companies in Nigeria. This may, 
therefore, be premised on the independence and the composi-
tion of the remuneration committee of Nigerian companies.
The result also shows that there is a negative and signifi-
cant relationship between gender diversity and earnings 
management practice of Nigerian companies at 1% level of 
significance. This, therefore, is an indication that the higher 
the level of gender diversity, the lower the earnings manage-
ment practices of Nigerian companies. This, therefore, means 
the higher the inclusion of women on the board of directors, 
the lower the earnings management practices in Nigeria. 
This is in line with the findings of Gulzar et al. (2011).
The result further shows that there is no significant relation-
ship between duality of chairman and CEO positions and earn-
ings management practice of Nigerian companies, although the 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix for Model.
Variable EEM Bodsize RemCom Gender Duality BodMeet Bodind ROA
EEM 1.0000  
Bodsize −.0372 1.0000  
RemCom −.0295 .1227 1.0000  
Gender −.0412 .0692 .0248 1.0000  
Duality −.0251 −.1041 −.0377 −.0214 1.0000  
BodMeet −.0785 .2241 .3077 .1434 −.1579 1.0000  
Bodind .0108 .2028 .1900 .1210 −.0961 .2556 1.0000  
ROA .0339 .0743 .0537 .0412 −.0076 −.0113 .0008 1.0000
Source. Field Study.
Note. EEM = earnings management; ROA = return on asset.
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relationship is positive, which means the higher the level of 
duality, the higher the likelihood for companies to manage 
earnings in Nigeria.
The result shows that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the frequency of board meetings and 
earnings management practices of Nigerian companies at 1% 
level of significance. This, therefore, shows that the higher 
the frequency of meetings of board members, the higher the 
likelihood of earnings management practices of Nigerian 
companies. This is in line with the findings of Sarkar et al. 
(2006).
The result further shows that there is a negative signifi-
cant relationship between board composition and earnings 
management practices of Nigerian companies at 5% level of 
significance. This, therefore, is a pointer to the fact that the 
higher the inclusion of nonexecutive board members on the 
board of directors, the lower the likelihood that Nigerian 
companies will engage in earnings management practices. 
This is in line with the studies of Xie et al. (2003), Murya 
(2010), Bello (2011), and Uadiale (2012).
Decision: With reference to the result of the test as pre-
sented above, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternate 
hypothesis accepted, to conclude that board structure has a 
significant effect on earnings management practices of listed 
companies in Nigeria.
Conclusion
From the analyses above, it is eminent that like other coun-
tries of the world, earnings management is in practice in 
Nigeria. There is a significant relationship between earnings 
management practices and corporate governance in Nigeria. 
It is clear that with appropriate implementation of the con-
tents of the Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria, finan-
cial report credibility can be enhanced and financial integrity 
of companies in Nigeria achieved. This study concludes that 
board composition has a negative and significant relation-
ship with earnings management in Nigeria. Thus, there is 
need for the directorate of corporate governance in the finan-
cial reporting council to enforce the rule on large board size 
as contained in the code. A board size of five may not be 
appropriate; thus, the minimum board size should be 
increased. This study also concludes that the independence 
of the audit committee, gender diversity, establishment of 
remuneration committee, board independence, and manage-
ment ownership percentage are all important factors to be 
considered for effective reduction of earnings management 
in Nigeria.
Epps and Ismail (2009) identified that firms with annually 
elected boards, small size boards, have more negative discre-
tionary accruals. However, firms with 75% to 90% indepen-
dent board or firms with a board size of between nine and 12 
have higher positive discretionary accruals. This, therefore, 
is a pointer to that fact the higher the board size, the lower the 
earnings management and vice versa. Ghosh et al. (2010), 
however, found that earnings management does not vary 
with board composition. This study, however, aims to find 
out the type of relationship that exists between earnings man-
agement and board composition.
Finally, this study concludes that a close monitoring of 
companies toward full adherence to the contents of the Code 
of Corporate Governance will serve as a tool for reducing 
Table 3. Tabular Presentation of Results for Board Structure.
Variables t value p > (t) significance Coefficient SE
BodSize −12.75 .000* −4.76e−06 3.73e−07
RemCom 0.22 .824 5.91e−07 2.65e−06
Gender −29.31 .000* −0.0004482 0.0000153
Duality 0.20 .841 8.18e−07 4.09e−06
BodMeet 8.86 .000* 0.0000216 2.44e−06
BodComp −2.31 .021* −0.0000186 8.05e−06
ROA 27.14 .000* 0.0000942 3.47e−06
TA 0.41 .681 3.44e−16 8.37e−16
Constant 17.20 .000* 0.0000864 5.03e−06
No. of observations 45,690
R2 Within = .0384
Between = .0007
Overall = .0018
sigma_u | 0.00007711
sigma_e | 0.00011638
rho | 0.30510688 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test that all u_i = 0: F(136, 45545) = 244.77 Prob > F = .0000
Source. Field Study.
Note. ROA = return on asset; TA = total assets.
*Significant at 1% significant level.
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earnings management practices in Nigeria, which will there-
after enhance the credibility of the financial reports pub-
lished by the companies, which in turn improves the level of 
confidence placed on the companies by the investors and the 
volume of investment in the nation of Nigeria is boosted.
Recommendations
From the findings of the study, the following are the recom-
mendations of the study:
1. Regulatory bodies should consider the enforcement 
of the contents of the Code of Corporate Governance 
that affect the board of directors, as they play a major 
role in the company they represent.
2. Regulators at all levels should enforce the prepara-
tion and publication of financial reports by compa-
nies as at when due.
3. Accounting professional bodies should engage in in-
depth research on the causes and remedies to fraud 
and unethical practices among their members. This 
will, therefore, make the professional bodies proac-
tive enough to avoid cases of fraud that may affect 
the public image of the profession. The accounting 
professional bodies should also seek for the total 
independence of the accountants from the directors 
of the companies, whereby the accountant is 
employed by an independent body and reports to the 
same independent body aside from the board of 
directors.
Authors’ Note
Portions of this article have been reproduced from the author’s previ-
ous work published in the Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
(http://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/8838) 
under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (https://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect 
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or 
authorship of this article.
References
Accounting Aisle. (2011). Financial statements—Why they’re a 
good idea.
Adegbite, E. (2012a). Corporate governance in the Nigerian bank-
ing industry: Towards governmental engagement. International 
Journal of Business Governance & Ethics, 7, 209-231.
Adegbite, E. (2012b). Corporate governance regulation in Nigeria. 
Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business 
in Society, 12, 257-276.
Akintoye, I. R. (2008). Efficient market hypothesis and behavioural 
finance: A review of literature. European Journal of Social 
Sciences, 7(2), 7-17.
Alzoubi, E. S., & Selamat, M. H. (2012). The effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms on constraining earning 
management: Literature review and proposed framework. 
International Journal of Global Business, 5, 17-35.
Amernic, J., & Craig, R. (2009). Understanding accounting through 
conceptual metaphor: Accounting is an instrument? Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 20, 875-883.
Anaro, B. (2011, August 22). Winners, losers from the debris of 
banking consolidation. Business Day.
Appalachian, S. U. (2006, October 27). Theories used in IS 
research: Stakeholder theory.
Beaudoin, C. A. (2008). Earnings management: The role of 
the agency problem and corporate social responsibility. 
Philadelphia, PA: Drexel University.
Bello, A. (2011). Corporate governance and accounting ethics in 
Nigeria. In International Conference on Management (ICM 
2011) Proceeding (pp. 1591-1608). Retrieved from http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1963971
Bugshan, T. (2005). Corporate governance, earnings manage-
ment, and the information content of accounting earnings: 
Theoretical model and empirical tests. Queensland, Australia: 
Bond University.
Chen, X., Lee, C. W. J., & Li, J. (2008). Government assisted earn-
ings management in China. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 27, 262-274.
Chtourou, S. M., Bedard, J., & Courteau, L. (2001, April). Retrieved 
from SSRN. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=275053
Chung, R., Firth, M., & Kim, J.-B. (2002). Institutional monitoring 
and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 8, 29-48.
Companies and Allied Matters Act. (1990). Retrieved from http://
www.nigeria-law.org/CompaniesAndAlliedMattersAct.htm
Dally, C. M., & Dalton, R. D. (1999). Corporate governance digest. 
Business Horizons, 42, 2-4.
Deakin, S., & Konzelmann, J. S. (2004). Learning from Enron. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12, 134-142.
Dechow, P. (1994). Accounting earnings and cash flows as mea-
sures of firm performance: The role of accounting accruals. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18, 3-42.
Dharan, B. G. (2003). Accruals management with financing and 
investing transactions. Retrieved from http://www.ruf.rice.
edu/~bala/files/dharan-accruals_management_with_financ-
ing_and_investing_transactions-12-03.pdf
Duztas, S. (2008). Corporate governance: The effects of board 
characteristics, information technology maturity and transpar-
ency on company Performance. Istanbul, Turkey: Graduate 
Institute of Social Sciences.
Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2012). Where do 
firms manage earnings? Review of Accounting Studies, 17, 
649-687.
Epps, R. W., & Ismail, T. H. (2009). Board of directors’ governance 
challenges and earnings management. Journal of Accounting & 
Organizational Change, 5, 390-416.
Freeman, R. E., Wicks, A. C., & Parmar, B. (2004). Stakeholder 
theory and “the corporate objective revisited.” Organization 
Science, 15, 364-369.
14 SAGE Open
Ghosh, A., Marra, A., & Moon, D. (2010). Corporate boards, audit 
committees, and earnings management: Pre- and post-SOX 
evidence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 37, 
1145-1176.
Gulzar, M. A., Wuhan, P., & Wang, Z. (2011). Corporate gover-
nance characteristics and earnings management: Empirical 
evidence from Chinese listed firms. International Journal of 
Accounting and Financial Reporting, 1, 133-151.
Gunny, K. (2005, January). What are the consequences of real 
earnings management? Haas School of Business, University of 
California. Retrieved from http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/accounting/
docs/speaker_papers/spring2005/Gunny_paper.pdf
Hand, J. R. (2003). The value relevance of financial statements 
in private equity markets. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/
abstract=484382
Healy, P. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting deci-
sions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 85-107.
Huang, D.-T., & Liu, Z. C. (2011). The relationships among gov-
ernance and earnings management: An empirical study on 
non-profit hospitals in Taiwan. African Journal of Business 
Management, 5, 5468-5476.
Hutchinson, M., & Leung, S. (2007). An investigation of factors 
influencing the association between top management owner-
ship and earnings management. Journal of Contemporary 
Accounting & Economics, 3, 130-153.
Ighomwenghian, K. (2010, April 13). Evans medicals—Making 
of another cadbury-gate? Daily Independence. Retrieved from 
www.allafrica.com/stories/201004150068.html
Ireland, J. (2005). Principles of accounting. London, England: 
Central Printing Service, University of London.
Iyoha, F. O. (2011). State agencies, industry regulations and 
the quality of accounting practice in Nigeria. Ota, Nigeria: 
Covenant University.
Joseph, K., & Atul, R. (2007). Intra-year shifts in the earnings 
distribution and their implications for earnings management. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44, 399-419.
Kim, I. S., & Imai, K. (2012, July 22). On the use of linear fixed 
effects regression models for causal inference. Retrieved from 
http://imai.princeton.edu/research/files/FEmatch.pdf
Koornhof, C. (1998). Accounting Information on flexibility. 
Pretoria, South Africa: University of Pretoria.
Kothari, S., Leone, J. A., & Wasley, E. C. (2005). Performance 
matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 39, 163-197.
Kothari, S., Ramanna, K., & Skinner, D. J. (2010). Implications 
for GAAP from an analysis of positive research in accounting. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 246-286.
Liming, G., Charlotte, J. W., & Shannon, L. L. (2005). Earnings 
management and forced CEO dismissal. Advances in 
Accounting, 21, 61-81.
Masahiro, E., Fumihiko, K., & Tomoyasu, Y. (2013). Accrual-
based and real earnings management: An international com-
parison for investor protection. Kobe, Japan: Research Institute 
for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University.
Masako, N. D., Hamid, P., & Shahrokh, S. (1998). Earnings man-
agement in Japanese companies. The International Journal of 
Accounting, 33, 313-334.
Microfinance Africa. (2010, July 27). Former chartered institute 
of bankers of Nigeria boss urges consistency in financial 
regulation policies. Nigerian Compass. Retrieved from http://
microfinanceafrica.net/tag/increase-in-nigerian-microfinance-
capital-base/
Murya, H. (2010). The effectiveness of corporate governance and 
external audit on constraining earnings management practice 
in the UK. Durham, NC: Durham University.
Obigbemi, I. F., Iyoha, F. O., & Ojeka, S. A. (2015). Firm size 
and financial performance: A determinant of corporate gov-
ernance disclosure practices of Nigerian companies. Journal 
of Accounting and Auditing: Research & Practice, 2015, 1-8. 
doi:10.5171/2015.467294
Obigbemi, I. F., Omolehinwa, E. O., Mukoro, D. O., & Obamiro, 
J. K. (2016). Corporate governance a tool for curbing earn-
ings management practices in Nigeria: Preparers perspective. 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 7(2), 234-242.
Ogunwusi, B., & Eazee, L. (2011, July 14). Investor loss N149.047 
billion in three days. Daily Independent. Retrieved from www.
allafrica.com/stories/201107150629.html
Okoye, I. E., & Alao, B. (2008). The ethics of creative accounting 
in financial reporting: The challenges of regulatory agencies in 
Nigeria. The Certified National Accountant, 16, 45-55.
Onwuamaeze, D. (2008, April 20). Cadbury’s fraudulent directors 
punished. News Watch, 58-59.
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. 
(2004). OECD principles of corporate governance. Paris, 
France: Author.
Otusanya, J. O., & Lauwo, S. (2010). The role of auditors in the 
Nigerian banking crisis. Accountancy Business and the Public 
Interest, 9, 159-204.
Ramly, Z., & Rashid, H. M. (2010). Critical review of literature on 
corporate governance and the cost of capital: The value cre-
ation perspective. African Journal of Business Management, 
4, 2198-2204.
Revsine, L. (1969). General purpose reports and users’ data needs. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 25, 37-46.
Robert, L., & Seybert, N. (2009). Behavioural studies of the effects 
of regulation on earnings management and accounting choice. 
In A. Hopwood (Ed.), Accounting, organizations, and institu-
tions: Essays for Anthony Hopwood (pp. 290-314). Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.
Saleh, N. M., Iskandar, T. M., & Rahmat, M. M. (2005). Earnings 
management and board characteristics: Evidence from 
Malaysia. Jurnal Pengurusan, 24, 77-103.
Samaha, K., Dahawy, K., Hussainey, K., & Stapleton, P. (2012). 
The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its deter-
minants in a developing market: The case of Egypt. Advances 
in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International 
Accounting, 28, 168-178.
Sarkar, J., Sarkar, S., & Sen, K. (2006, April 1). Board of directors 
and opportunistic earnings management: Evidence from India. 
Retrieved from http://www.isb.edu/caf/htmls/Jayati.pdf
Securities and Exchange Commission. (2003). Code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Lagos, Nigeria: Corporate Affairs 
Commission.
Shaomin, L., David, D. S., & Michael, S. (2011). “Keep silent and 
make money”: Institutional patterns of earnings management 
in China. Journal of Asian Economics, 22, 369-382.
Sori, Z. M. (2009). Accounting Information Systems (AIS) and 
knowledge management: A case study. American Journal of 
Scientific Research, 4, 36-44.
Obigbemi et al. 15
Stanford Graduate School of Business. (2005, November). Financial 
statements are still valuable tools for predicting bankruptcy. 
Retrieved from http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/
acctg_mcnichols-beaver_bankruptcy.shtml
Tsai, C. F., & Chiou, Y. J. (2009). Earnings management predic-
tion: A pilot study of combining neural networks and decision 
trees. Expert Systems With Applications, 36, 7183-7191.
Uadiale, O. M. (2012). Earnings management and corporate gover-
nance in Nigeria. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 
3(3), 1-10.
Universal College of Accountancy. (2004). Study pack on basic 
accounting for ATS 1. Lagos: Philglad Nigeria.
Van, C. T. (2002). Earnings management induced by cognitive ref-
erence points. British Accounting Review, 34, 167-178.
Xiao, C., Chi-Wen, J. L., & Jing, L. (2008). Government assisted 
earnings management in China. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, 27, 262-274.
Xie, B., Davidson, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings manage-
ment and corporate governance: The role of the board and the 
audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, 295-316.
Author Biographies
Imoleayo F. Obigbemi is a scholar and a lecturer in the Department 
of Accounting, Covenant University.
Eddy O. Omolehinwa is a professor of accounting at the University 
of Lagos Akoka.
Dick Oluku Mukoro is a lecturer of accounting in the Department 
of Accounting, Covenant University.
Egbide Ben-Caleb is a researcher and lecturer of accounting in the 
Department of Accounting, Covenant University.
Olamide Adeola Olusanmi is a scholar and researcher in the 
Department of Accounting, Covenant University.
